Terms of reference

Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions

Whereas, given concerns expressed surrounding foreign interference with respect to the 43rd and 44th general elections, the Government of Canada and the leaders of all recognized parties in the House of Commons recognize both the cardinal importance of preserving the integrity of Canada’s electoral processes and democratic institutions and the need for transparency in order to enhance Canadians’ trust and confidence in their democracy; Whereas the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency are undertaking reviews with respect to foreign interference in federal electoral processes in accordance with their respective statutory mandates; And whereas the leaders of all recognized parties in the House of Commons have supported the establishment of a public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions with respect to the 43rd and 44th general elections; Therefore, Her Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister,

1. directs that a Commission do issue, for the period beginning on the day on which this Order is made and ending on Febr uary 11, 20 25, under P art I of the Inquiries Act and under the Great Seal of Canada, appointing the Honourable Ma rie-José e Hogue, puisne judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec, as Commissioner (“the Commissioner”), to conduct an Inquiry under the name of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions (“Public Inquiry”), which Commission must
   1. direct that the Commissioner
      1. examine and assess interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or n on-sta te actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections at the national and electoral district levels,
      2. in relation to the issues set out in cl ause (A ), examine and assess the flow of information to senior dec ision-make rs, including elected officials, and between the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol panel during the election periods that led up to the 43rd and 44th general elections, and in the weeks following those periods, and actions taken in response,
      3. examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes, notably in relation to
         1. the creation, sharing, assessment and distribution of intelligence and the formulation of advice to senior deci sion-make rs, including elected officials,
         2. the supports and protections in place for members of a diaspora who may be especially vulnerable and may be the first victims of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes, and
         3. the mechanisms that were in place to protect the integrity of the 43rd and 44th general elections from foreign interference as compared to those in place in previous recent federal elections that the Commissioner determines to be relevant,
         1. maximize the degree of public transparency while taking all necessary steps to prevent the disclosure of information whose disclosure could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, in accordance with the procedures set out in clause ( iii)(C ),
         2. consider the use of alternative measures, such as summaries, in accordance with the procedures set out in clause (i ii)‍(C ), to describe withheld information and, to the extent possible, explain decisions to withhold information in order to foster understanding of the limitations on and impacts of the disclosure of classified information and intelligence, and
         3. address any relevant classified content in a separate report, if required,
         1. in relation to the issues set out in claus es (A ) and (B), by no later than Febru ary 29, 202 4, and
         2. in relation to the issues set out in cla uses (C ) to (E), by no later than De cember 31, 2024 ;
         1. adopt any procedures and methods that they may consider expedient for the proper and efficient conduct of the Public Inquiry, accept submissions in the manner they choose, including electronically, and sit at any times, in any manner and in any place in Canada that they may deem appropriate,
         2. receive and review any relevant classified or unclassified documents,
         3. at the Commissioner’s discretion, grant any person who, in the Commissioner’s assessment, would provide appropriate and necessary contributions to, and has a substantial and direct interest in, the subject matter of the Public Inquiry, an opportunity for appropriate participation in the public portions of the Public Inquiry,
         4. recommend to the Clerk of the Privy Council that funding be provided, in accordance with approved guidelines respecting remuneration and expenses and the assessment of accounts, to any person described in cla use (C ) if the person would not, in the Commissioner’s view, otherwise be able to participate in the Public Inquiry, and
         5. engage the services of the experts and other persons referred to in secti on 1 1 of the Inquiries Act, and pay them remuneration and expenses as approved by the Treasury Board;
         1. perform their duties without expressing any conclusion or recommendation regarding the civil or criminal liability of any person or organization,
         2. perform their duties in such a way as to ensure that the conduct of the Public Inquiry does not jeopardize any ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding, or any other investigation, and provide appropriate notice to the government institution responsible of any potential impact,
         3. in conducting the Public Inquiry, maximize the degree of public transparency while taking all steps necessary to prevent the disclosure to persons or bodies other than the Government of Canada of information whose disclosure could, in the opinion of the Commissioner, be injurious to the critical interest of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, and conduct proceedings in accordance with the following procedures:
            1. on the request of the Attorney General of Canada, the Commissioner must receive information in camera and in the absence of any party and their counsel if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, its disclosure could be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security,
            2. the Commissioner may disclose a part or a summary of the information received in camera if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, its disclosure would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, but must, prior to disclosure, provide the Attorney General of Canada with an opportunity to make submissions to the Commissioner regarding the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security,
            3. if the Commissioner concludes that, contrary to the submissions of the Attorney General of Canada referred to in sub clause (II ), disclosure of a part or a summary of information received in camera would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, the Commissioner must notify the Attorney General of Canada, which will constitute notice under sec tion 38.01 of the Canada Evidence Act,
            4. the Commissioner must provide the Attorney General of Canada with an opportunity to review any report suitable for disclosure to the public referred to in clau se (i (G) and to make, prior to their submission to the Governor in Council, submissions to the Commission regarding the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, and
            5. if the Commissioner concludes that, contrary to the submissions of the Attorney General of Canada referred to in su bclause (IV ), the disclosure of information contained in the report intended for disclosure to the public would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security, the Commissioner must notify the Attorney General of Canada, which will constitute notice under secti on 38.0 1 of the Canada Evidence Act,

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            Date modified: 2024-07-11